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Introduction  
On 6 April 1994, Hutu extremists shot down Rwandan President Habyarimana's plane 
and began the systematic execution of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.1 In less than an hour, 
roadside barriers sprang up throughout Kigali and the Presidential Guard began arresting 
and executing people from a compiled list.2 Shortly thereafter, they began their planned 
full-scale genocide, in which between 500,000 and one million people were slaughtered 
in less than three months. Hutu extremists chose to ignore the Arusha Accords, which 
were to resolve Rwanda's political dilemma, in favor of a "final solution" to obtain 
political victory. However, as the civil war reignited, they soon lost any hope of such a 
victory, since the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) won a military victory 
and gained control of the Rwandan government in July 1994.  
Was the genocide preventable? Clearly, there were warning signs which could have 
triggered international action to prevent the impending blood bath. Amnesty International 
reported that 2,300 people were killed, with complete impunity, prior to Habyarimana's 
assassination.3 The signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement on 4 August 1993 
represented an apparent success for preventive diplomacy. However, this was just the 
beginning of its test as an effective means to stem violent conflict. The resolve of all 
parties to uphold an agreement and the ability of the international community to influence 
the parties to continue the path toward peace when impediments occur are critical 
variables for successful preventive diplomacy. The Rwanda catastrophe does not deal a 
death blow to this means of conflict resolution. However, an examination of the period 
from the signing of the Arusha Accords to Habyarimana's murder illuminates some 
weaknesses which must be addressed to make preventive diplomacy more effective in 
resolving future crises.  
Requirements for Effective Preventive Diplomacy  
Stephen Stedman defines preventive diplomacy as concerted action designed to resolve, 
manage, or contain disputes before they become violent.4 It implies that a third party 
serves as a mediator to resolve conflict between two or more parties. The first step in 
preventive diplomacy is getting the disputing parties to consent to resolve their 
differences through negotiation. Once an agreement is reached, the parties must abide by 
it and implement it. These first requirements refer to the disputing parties, and therefore 
are called internal variables. In the best case, successful preventive diplomacy produces a 
negotiated settlement which both parties are prepared to implement.  
The humanitarian tragedies of Rwanda were caused mainly by leaders who were 
interested neither in reaching non-violent solutions to conflicts nor in making 
concessions.5 At Arusha, the Rwanda government, RPF, and Hutu opposition parties 
appeared to want peace and to uphold the accords. However, it soon became clear that 
extremist elements within the Hutu government did not really intend to abide by the 
agreement. In such a situation, successful preventive diplomacy requires external actors 
to influence the concerned parties to implement and uphold the agreed solution. External 
influence usually takes the form of political or economic "carrots and sticks" which are 
used to persuade the internal factions to abide by the agreements. If this does not work, 
then the only means to avert a breakdown is the willingness of external actors to threaten 
to use military force and, if necessary, to use it. Stedman stressed that:  
Such willingness need not be costly, if the threat is enough to make leaders back down. 
But if threats prove ineffective, then only the use of force with the risk of prolonged 
involvement in a civil war will work.6  
These last two requirements, called external variables, concern the international actors 
who want to resolve the conflict peacefully, but who also are willing, if necessary, to use 
force to do so. The four variables required for effective preventive diplomacy will be 
analyzed in the context of Rwanda, from August 1993 until 6 April 1994.  
From Ethnic Turmoil to Civil War  
The seeds of Rwanda's civil war were sown in 1959, when Hutus with Belgian support 
ousted the Tutsi monarchy.7 Shortly afterward, a Hutu "revolution" resulted in massacres 
of Tutsis and the creation of the Tutsi diaspora. Attempts by Tutsi exiles to launch 
insurgencies in early 1960s failed with Hutu backlashes against the internal Tutsi 
population.8 The 1990 RPF invasion from Uganda brought similar reprisals against Tutsis 
by the Habyarimana regime. Anyone who opposed the regime was viewed as an RPF 
supporter.  
It was the refusal of the Habyarimana regime to accept a peaceful resolution of the status 
of expatriate Tutsi refugees and their return to Rwanda that prompted the 1990 invasion. 
On 1 October 1990, RPF forces, composed primarily of 10,000 Tutsi exiles from 
Uganda's National Resistance Army, launched a conventional attack from Uganda into 
northern Rwanda. This attack began a new chapter in roughly thirty years of bloodshed 
between Hutus and Tutsis. The  
Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), with help from French and Zairian troops, pushed the 
rebels back into Uganda. The Rwandan government soon asked the undisciplined Zairian 
soldiers to leave as they became more of a hindrance than a help. However, French 
paratroopers remained until December 1993. The RPF (also called the RPA  Rwandan 
Patriotic Army) under Paul Kagame's command, reorganized its forces to pursue a 
guerrilla war in northern Rwanda. Government propaganda caused masses of Hutu 
peasants to flee RPF advances throughout the course of the civil war.9 Through a series of 
offensives and subsequent negotiated withdrawals, the RPF gained control of about five 
percent of Rwanda along the border with Uganda when it signed a ceasefire in August 
1993 with the Rwanda government.  
In response to the RPF invasion, the 5,000 man FAR rapidly expanded with French 
training assistance to nearly 30,000 by 1993.10 The Presidential Guard and Hutu extremist 
militias (the ruling Mouvement National Republicain pour la Democratie et le 
Developpement [MNRD]'s interahamwe and the Coalition pour la Defense de la 
Republique [CDR]'s impuzamubambi), who comprised the main perpetrators of the 
genocide and preceding political violence, emerged during this expansion. France, Egypt 
and South Africa provided the bulk of the arms used to equip the expanded army and 
militias.11 The flood of heavier weapons, namely armored vehicles, mortars and artillery, 
contributed to thousands of civilian casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced 
persons, especially when the war resumed in April 1994. As the FAR increased its 
strength, so did its tendency to commit crimes with impunity. Massacre operations, 
especially those carried out by the Presidential Guard, became the order of the day.12 The 
Presidential Guard, the regime's most trusted unit, consisted exclusively of Hutu 
extremists from the northwest, President and Madame Habyarimana's home.  
The interahamwe, the armed youth wing of the MNRD, was created in 1992 with the sole 
purpose of terrorizing the perceived enemies of the Habyarimana regime. The much 
smaller impuzamugambi was created later for the same reason. Although France may not 
have directly trained the militias and youth wings of the MNRD and CDR, these elements 
received terrorist training at FAR bases throughout the country.13 An OAU Neutral 
Military Observer Group (OAUNMOG)14 officer stated that, "military officers out of 
uniform led extremist Hutu militia units and had an efficient system in place that could 
mobilize 500 plus youths in an hour to execute specific missions" (initially 
demonstrations, but later political violence and after 6 April 1994, mass murder).15 
Nationwide, the interahamwe and the impuzamugambi ranged between 10,000 and 
30,000 members.  
From October 1990 until August 1993, the Rwandan government fought a civil war 
against the RPF, while simultaneously trying to make progress on political reform. In 
April 1992, a multi-party government was sworn in. Serious negotiations with the RPF 
and the various Hutu opposition parties began in June  
1992, and resulted in the signing of the Arusha Accords on 4 August 1993. Rwanda's 
post-colonial history of outright violence makes the Rwandan situation more comparable 
to long-standing civil wars in other regions where animosities and tensions run deep. This 
is why the internal factors are critical, especially if the parties (one or both) really do not 
want to peacefully resolve their disputes.16  
The Arusha Accords  
The Arusha Peace Agreement ended three years of fighting and was to pave the way for 
multi-party general elections. According to the treaty the existing government would 
remain in office until a transitional government was set up within 37 days from the 
signing of the accords. All registered political parties were eligible to participate in the 
transitional government and were allocated ministerial posts. The CDR, a Hutu extremist 
party that advocated Hutu supremacy, opposed the negotiations and had been excluded 
from the process due to RPF objections to their participation. Once the transitional 
government was in place, the two sides would integrate their militaries into a single 
national army of 19,000 men.17 A Neutral International Force (NIF) would ensure 
security throughout the country during the transitional period. Finally, multi-party 
elections would be held in 22 months. Both the Rwandan government and the RPF 
agreed that Faustin Twagiramungu, the president of the Mouvement Democratique de la 
Republique (MDR), would become prime minister of the broadly-based interim 
government.18 The international community praised the signing of the accords.  
Neutral International Force  
The Neutral International Force became the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) when on 5 October 1993 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 872. 
At the same time the Council also approved the proposal that the UN Observer Mission 
on Uganda-Rwanda Border (UNOMUR), created in June 1993, be integrated into 
UNAMIR.19 Initially, the peacekeeping mission would consist of 1,217 soldiers, 211 
military observers, including the integration of the 88 military observers from UNOMUR 
and the 132 man expanded OAUNMOG and various support and staff. UNAMIR would 
then assume all military observer and security missions.  
The UNAMIR mandate included various guarantees to Rwanda as stated in Resolution 
872. It consisted of:  
contributing to the security in Kigali; monitoring observance of the cease-fire agreement; 
observing the security situations during the final period of the transitional government's 
mandate, leading up to elections; assisting with mine clearing; investigating at the request 
of parties or on its own initiative instances of non-compliance with the provisions of the 
Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any 
such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the UN 
Secretary General; monitoring the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and the resettlement 
of displaced persons; assisting in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in 
conjunction with relief operations; to investigate and report incidents regarding the 
activities of the gendarmerie or police.20  
The UNAMIR mission would initially last six months and was subject to review and 
renewal in April 1994. UNAMIR was a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation with a 
capability appropriate to its mandate.21 Its main function was to provide an international 
presence monitoring the political transition. UNAMIR will be examined during the 
analysis of the role of external actors.  
Parties Agreed to Negotiate a Settlement  
The Arusha Accords fulfilled the first requirement for successful preventive diplomacy as 
the warring parties agreed to negotiate a settlement to Rwanda's ethno-political problems. 
Concurrent with the peace accord signing ceremony, representatives from over three-
quarters of Rwanda's political parties and the RPF signed a political code of ethics. The 
government had recognized the RPF as a legitimate political party only recently with the 
signing of the Kinihira Agreement on 30 May 1993. The code stated that the signatories 
would refrain from indulging in any forms of violence and incitement to violence through 
written words, verbal messages or any other means; to reject and combat political 
ideology and any acts aimed at promoting discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, 
religion, or gender.22 The accords and the code of ethics gave hope that Rwanda would be 
able to move forward and that political differences could be solved using democratic 
means. Therefore, the first internal variable needed for effective preventive diplomacy 
was present in the Rwanda case.  
The True Test: 
Willingness to Abide by and Implement Arusha  
Although preventive diplomacy appeared to be working in Rwanda, the critical point 
would be implementing and abiding by the negotiated agreement. Hutu opposition parties 
and the RPF appeared willing to abide by and implement the Arusha Accords.23 The RPF 
had won the right to participate as a legitimate party in internal Rwandan politics and 
would share power alongside the government. However, as a final agreement neared 
completion at Arusha, Rwandans in Kigali displayed a mood of skepticism that deep-
rooted ethnic animosities cultivated since 1959 could be resolved by the peace 
agreement. Additionally, coup rumors circulated but were largely discounted as 
unrealistic. But perhaps they were not. In a radio speech Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana 
urged support for the peace agreement, while criticizing an undefined group who opposed 
her government and accusing them of looking for a way to sabotage the signing of the 
peace accords.24  
Once the peace treaty was signed, it became clear that the Rwanda government had little 
intention of establishing the broadly-based transition government, delaying its creation at 
every turn. The president stymied fulfilment of the power-sharing agreement. More 
importantly, extremist elements in the MNRD, in conjunction with its offshoot the CDR, 
pursued their agenda of genocide to eliminate moderate opposition Hutus and Tutsis. 
Hutu extremists had already established the instruments needed to derail the accords: the 
Presidential Guard, interahamwe and impuzamugambi militias, extremist newspapers, 
and the Radio Milles Collines, a "hate radio" station.  
Extremist Resistance and Genocide Preparation  
Hutu extremists feared losing control of their primary source of wealth, the state, as a 
result of the peace agreement and ongoing democratization process. President 
Habyarimana and his family-in-law had established a political-commercial network, 
referred to as the Akuzu (the little house), which conducted fraudulent traffic of several 
kinds, currency deals and the "taking" of commissions in many areas.25 The Akuzu played 
a fundamental role by publishing Hutu extremist newspapers, leading the Presidential 
Guard and Hutu extremists militias, and running Radio Milles Collines.26  
The Hutu population was exposed daily to views published in the approximately twenty 
Hutu extremist newspapers that had served as the mouthpiece of the regime since 1990. 
Rwanda is a relatively literate country in African terms with roughly 69 percent of its 
population able to read and write. Therefore, extremist propagandists had little problem 
reaching the general populace.27 The regime also used radio stations to psychologically 
prepare the population for its part in the impending genocide.  
Anyone who had a message of hate or extremism could access the state owned radio. On 
April 4, 1993 President Habyarimana commissioned Radio Television Libre des Milles 
Collines (RTLM), a privately owned radio whose directors were mostly members of the 
AKUZU. This was a station whose sole purpose was the preparation of people's for the 
genocide. This FM radio station broadcasted propaganda and misinformation and had an 
uninterrupted power supply whose bills were paid for by the state.28  
The events in Rwanda in 1994 were not the result of seething ethnic hatred, but rather the 
culmination of decades of government manipulation of the rural Hutu peasants in the 
collines (hills). Gerard Prunier commented that,  
As horrible as these cases of civilian violence are, they must be analyzed as a political 
phenomenon. It should be first pointed out that in no instance did they represent a 
spontaneous eruption of 'ancient tribal hatreds' and that it was a matter of operations 
coldly carried out by the MNRD and CDR militias.29  
The Rwanda genocide was prepared long in advance by the senior leadership of the 
MNRD and CDR. The preparation of a plan for political extermination was exposed by 
Rwandan and international human rights activists long before the signing of the Arusha 
Accords, yet nothing was done to thwart it.30 A Rwandan human rights publication 
carried an article in August 1992 detailing the involvement of over 25 members of 
Habyarimana's inner circle in death squad activity, including the president and three of 
his brothers-in-law and a son-in-law.31 Furthermore, during the period from August 1992 
(the OAU-brokered ceasefire) until June 1993 (the start of the Arusha negotiations) the 
Rwandan government was less than honest in upholding the ceasefire. An African officer 
serving with the OAUNMOG noted,  
The biggest problem concerned the political aspects of the agreement. The Government 
never exercised the truth of cease-fire with massive build ups and aircraft overflights. 
Human rights reports identified those responsible for genocide killings but nothing was 
done about them. Military Observers were unable to conduct investigations. The RPA 
had live prisoners while the FAR had no RPA POWs.32  
Commenting on the February 1993 RPF offensive, "The RPA had no option because 
static positional warfare was too costly."33 Clearly, extremist elements had no intention of 
abiding by the Arusha Accords nor sharing power with their opposition.  
Derailing the Accords  
The Habyarimana regime lost little time in subverting the Arusha Agreement. According 
to Twagiramungu, the prime minister-designate, extremist soldiers, notably the 
Presidential Guard, wanted the president to resume the war with the RPF while 
Habyarimana merely had wanted to use delaying tactics by refusing to form the 
transitional government.34 As time progressed, tactics of political squabbling, which 
delayed establishing the transitional government, shifted to acts of violence and political 
assassination.  
The first significant breach occurred on 6 October 1993. The RPF accused the coalition 
government of passing economic measures in breach of the terms agreed to in Arusha. 
Specifically, "the Government was making commitments that could prejudice the 
achievement of the program of a broadly-based transitional government . . . regarding 
privatizations, the transfer of decision-making powers, changes in the usual way of 
naming local administrators and launching problematic projects, all outside the Arusha 
Accord mandate."35 Shortly thereafter, government forces arrested 13 young RPF 
supporters or alleged supporters of the RPF leadership at Gankenke, Nyarutovu 
Commune in Ruhengeri Prefecture. This was in direct violation of the Arusha Accords 
and the previously negotiated Kinihira Agreement, which gave the RPF the right to carry 
out political activities throughout Rwanda.36  
On 17-18 November 1993, assailants armed with knives and clubs massacred 40 people 
in Ruhengeri and Byumba Prefectures, the day before the Belgian contingent of 
UNAMIR arrived in Kigali. In one incident, a candidate for Burgomaster of Kidaho 
Commune was beheaded.37 As a result, the FAR suspended all sessions with the joint 
commissions with the RPF until the RPF could guarantee the renunciation of similar 
actions and declared that it was ready to resume the peace process.38 A UN inquiry into 
the massacres put the number of dead at 37. The UNAMIR report was inconclusive 
stating the MNRD supporters had been killed, but that it was not sure the attackers came 
from the RPF. Many of the victims had either political affiliations or some political 
responsibilities, and were or had been members of the MNRD.39  
The RPF and the government accused each other of the attacks. A few days prior to the 
incidents, President Habyarimana talked about insecurity in the zone. Saying that as long 
as insecurity prevailed, things would not go well.  
We asked that elections be postponed because there was no security. We also feel 
concern over the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreements, and even the Kinihira 
Agreements, since the RPF has already started to transgress very blatantly. We fear that if 
these violations continue, troubles might spread countrywide. The government must do 
something substantial to stop these massacres, which are happening in Ruhengeri and 
Byumba Prefectures. We also think the UN Force should be deployed in the zone as soon 
as possible, that investigations be undertaken, and that the culprits be identified.40  
However, according to the RPF there was no insecurity.  
The RPF accused the MNRD of having more of an interest in an absence of security in 
the zone, because, first they do not want elections to occur, and second, they want to 
create insecurity to prevent the broad-based transitional government from being 
established. The MNRD have means, they have structures in various communes, and they 
can use their militias and those of the CDR, a Hutu group to massacre people and burn 
houses. In brief, they can always succeed but it is not the population, it will be the 
MNRD or CDR militias.41  
The November massacres were the first incidents following the signing of the Arusha 
Accords and added to the series of "dress rehearsal" massacres that began in 1991 and 
foreshadowed full-scale genocide.42  
In December the situation seemed to brighten as UNAMIR completed its deployment and 
as French troops departed Kigali. UNAMIR fulfilled its requirements for establishing the 
broadly-based transitional government and National Assembly by 31 December 1993. 
The 600-man RPF infantry battalion designated to protect RPF officials arrived in Kigali, 
escorted by UNAMIR on 28 December 1993. However, political manoeuvres delayed the 
setting up of institutions. Some parties substituted lists of deputies other than those 
agreed on in the Arusha Accords. The CDR reversed its negative position, now insisting 
on participating in the Transitional National Assembly.43  
Delays continued throughout January, prompting the RPF to warn that it would resume 
fighting unless the transitional government was formed. In Kigali, RPF soldiers killed 
two civilians in separate incidents. Finally, Twagiramungu accused the Defense Ministry 
of giving military training to more than 1,000 members of the MNRD Youth Wing, the 
interahamwe.44  
Events in February arguably were a final "trial run" by Hutu extremists. RPF 
representatives were ambushed in Gasta, on the outskirts of Kigali. The intent 
presumably was to wipe out RPF leaders invited to Kigali by UNAMIR.45 On 22 
February 1994, Hutu militia assassinated Felicien Gatabazi, the General Secretary for the 
Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the designated Minister of Public Works. In 
retaliation, Tutsis lynched Martin Bucyana, a radical Hutu leader and President of the 
CDR, in Butare, also Gatabazi's home. Ethnic violence increased with more use of 
firearms and grenades in the wake of the two assassinations. As a consequence, 
investiture ceremonies for the new government were postponed for the third time in two 
months.46 The purpose of the attacks also may have been to discern the reaction by the 
international community, which thus far had done little in response to previous Hutu 
militia attacks.  
The political impasse continued as violence increased and the government and the RPF 
prepared for renewed fighting. On 15 March 1994, five people, including a candidate for 
a parliamentary seat in the Transitional National Assembly, were killed in Kinihira. 
President Habyarimana reiterated his call on UNAMIR to redouble its vigilance and 
conduct investigations to find the murders.47 This pronouncement came amid the daily 
hate broadcasts by Radio Milles Collines, which exhorted Hutus to eradicate the 
opposition, especially Tutsis.  
A well-informed source indicated that the RPF was reorganizing its military positions in 
northern Rwanda, while President Habyarimana was also reinforcing his army. Arms 
were widely available among the civilian population, especially in the northwest, which 
was Habyarimana's home region, due to increased militia activity.48 Furthermore, UN 
Emissary Booh-Booh reported that the regime was distributing arms widely among Hutu 
farmers in order to concentrate primarily on the arms race which the government claimed 
the RPF had begun. Independent sources also confirmed that the RPF bought arms in 
Eastern Europe and Belgium.49 To summarize, the indicators of preparations for a 
renewed civil war were coupled with more extremist hate propaganda in the Hutu radical 
newspapers, Radio Milles Collines broadcasts, and ever increasing and more overt Hutu 
militia activity.  
Preventive diplomacy can claim success in resolving conflicts if the two internal 
variables, agreeing to negotiate and a willingness to abide by and implement the 
agreement, are present. Although the first variable was present, clearly the second was 
missing in the Rwanda case. Therefore, preventive diplomacy would require the presence 
of the two external variables, the ability of outside actors to influence and enforce the 
agreement and if all else fails the willingness of these actors to use force to enforce the 
settlement, if the international community had any hope of upholding Arusha and 
averting the resumption of massive violence.  
External Actors' Ability to Influence 
and Enforce the Settlement  
Did various countries and international organizations have the ability to influence and 
enforce the agreement despite the fact that, as the preceding section demonstrates, the 
Rwanda genocide was prepared long in advance by the senior MNRD and CDR 
leadership. The preparation of a plan for political extermination was exposed long before 
the signing of the Arusha Agreement by various sources inside and outside the country. 
However, the international community failed to take heed to prevent its execution.50  
France: A Negative Influence  
Once the accords were signed, the international community lacked sufficient influence in 
getting the Habyarimana government to establish the transitional government. France 
probably could have exerted more influence to prevent the looming disaster, except that 
the presence of their troops in Kigali until December 1993 and sustained shipments of 
arms to the army probably gave Habyarimana a sense of support which encouraged him 
to pursue his delaying tactics. French advisers also continued to train the interahamwe 
even after the departure of uniformed soldiers in December 1993. "The Rwandese 
leadership kept believing that no matter what it did, French support would be 
forthcoming. And it had no valid reasons for believing otherwise."51  
Since late 1990, France had deployed troops to Rwanda to support the Habyarimana 
regime. Rwanda epitomized the French perception of the struggle for control of Africa 
between la Francophonie led by France, and la Anglophonie led by Great Britain and of 
late, the United States. The RPF, whose principal leaders were anglophones who grew up 
in and were supported by Uganda, were viewed by Paris as the devil incarnate, to be 
stopped at all costs. Otherwise other francophone countries could leave the fold and 
France would be shown to be unable to protect its clients.52 The French had two 
companies totalling approximately 300 men in Kigali, officially charged with protecting 
French citizens living in Rwanda. However, at times they were involved in direct combat 
against the RPF during the war. The French forces supporting the Rwanda government 
did not plan to leave Kigali before mid-October 1993 at the earliest. The departure of 
French troops depended on the deployment of the Neutral International Force 
(UNAMIR), as agreed upon in the Arusha Accords. The French stated that the Neutral 
International Force would have to number 1,000, a sufficient figure by French estimates 
to protect French citizens, before their troops would depart.53  
The RPF made it clear that they would not send their political or military representatives 
to Kigali to participate in the transitional institutions as long as the French forces 
remained in the capital. International observers noted that if the French insisted on the 
1,000 man force level before departure, they could provoke a political crisis that would 
considerably delay the peace implementation process. That is, in fact, what transpired. 
Moreover, France continued to provide arms to the FAR, even during the UN arms 
embargo.54  
Other International Influences: Diplomatic and Economic Pressure  
Preventive diplomacy was the strategy of choice used by external actors to keep the 
Arusha Peace Agreement alive and in their efforts to resolve the political conflicts that 
were becoming more and more violent. At the end of November, following the massacres 
and ceasefire violations, a convention convened in Mombasa, Kenya. Representatives 
from all sides in the Rwanda conflict called on the RPF and the government to implement 
the Arusha Accords and to end the violence in the country. They also asked for 
international aid to help put the agreement into effect55 For now, negotiation seemed to 
work as UNAMIR finished deploying, French soldiers left Rwanda, and conditions for 
establishing the transition government appeared to be on track.  
However, postponement of the transitional government's investiture, coupled with the 
growing violence, prompted further international attention on getting both sides to uphold 
Arusha. Throughout January and February, UNAMIR, the international community's 
agent in Rwanda, did its best to break the political impasse by executing its mandate. On 
13 February, Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire, the UNAMIR commander, 
remarked concerning the deteriorating security situation:  
My men are conducting patrols; they are conducting checkpoints to see if arms 
are being moved around. They are monitoring all the military installations to 
ensure both sides respond to the weapons secure area. They are providing escorts 
for the RPF and for government officials; they are conducting investigations on 
any cease-fire violations. They are monitoring, through our civilian police, the 
judicial actions and investigations by the Gendarmerie, and providing technical 
assistance.56  
Also in mid-February, UN Special Envoy Booh-Booh raised the alarm about the 
impending disaster. "UNAMIR had proof that a great many weapons have been 
distributed to the population. Moreover, there were also training camps for militia 
personnel."57 He also reported that UNAMIR had no influence on the creation of the 
transitional government, which had been blocked by President Habyarimana and 
divisions within a number of the Hutu opposition parties, despite the UN threat to 
withdraw from Rwanda if no progress was made. The UN had made the deployment of 
1,200 additional troops (bringing UNAMIR to 2,500) conditional on progress in 
implementing the accords.  
At this juncture threatening to leave was an ineffective use of negative influence. A more 
appropriate strategy would have been to review and strengthen UNAMIR's mandate and 
increase the combat capability of its forces, so it could be proactive rather than reactive 
and impotent.  
While this strategy relates to the willingness to use force, the fourth variable, it remains 
within the ability to influence and enforce the agreement. This action would have 
demonstrated the resolve of the international community by enhancing its ability to 
influence events in Rwanda by increasing its coercive power without actually using 
military force. In fact in January, Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal, UNAMIR second-in-
command, recommended that the 450 man Belgian contingent be increased to 800 and 
provided with heavy machine guns and anti-tank weapons.58 In February, an unidentified, 
well-informed Belgian official recommended that the UNAMIR mandate should be 
reviewed and reinforced, citing that perhaps an insufficient number of troops helped to 
explain the profusion of weapons and the deterioration of security. Furthermore, then 
Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes, acknowledged to the Belgian Parliament that Hutu 
extremist propaganda regularly criticized Belgian soldiers and that the Hutu militias 
organized demonstrations at important times that were followed by small incidents with 
RPF leaders in Kigali.59 Apparently the United Nations and the countries who actively 
encouraged and supported the Arusha Peace Process underestimated the problems which 
are associated with reorganizing a political system.60 Neither the Belgian government nor 
the UN Security Council, responsible for reviewing UNAMIR's mandate, took significant 
action despite warnings and requests for upgrading combat capabilities.  
Diplomatic pressure provided little incentive for Rwandan leaders to stop the delaying 
tactics. In early March, Belgian Defense Minister Leo Delcroix visited Kigali and 
strongly urged Rwandan leaders to find a solution to the crisis. He noted,  
First impressions are that the country's politicians seem to have taken little heed of 
increasing international pressure to finally set up the transitional government and 
Parliament as laid down by the Arusha Accords. The choice is simple, pursue the process 
of democratization or civil war will return.61  
International financial donors, who were essential to the Rwandan economy, threatened 
to cut aid to apply more leverage to Habyarimana, but without result. Belgium threatened 
to suspend aid of approximately 1 billion Belgian Francs per year if democratization was 
not pursued, and then raised the stakes by declaring that it may reconsider its 
participation in UNAMIR.62 Furthermore, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund tried to use their influence, since they had the power to decide whether or 
not to grant further loans to Rwanda in the absence of the Rwandan institutions needed to 
draw up and approve a new recovery program. Rwanda needed foreign funds desperately, 
since its coffers were empty.63  
Since economic pressure had little success with the Hutu extremists in the government, 
the European Parliament asked the international community, notably the United Nations, 
the European Union (EU), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to "put an 
immediate end" to the hostilities in Rwanda. The Belgian representative, understanding 
where events were heading, accused the international community of not having played its 
role as a peacekeeping force. "Let us intervene now, because it is still not too late in 
Rwanda."64 Again nothing was done except more negotiating, because the external actors 
lacked the political will to use force to enforce the accords.  
On 21 March 1994, following a week of intense negotiations between all political parties, 
including the RPF, overseen by the Tanzanian foreign minister, Prime Minister designate 
Twagiramungu analyzed events: 
He reemphasized that on April 5, 1994 the UN Security Council will reconsider the 
UNAMIR mandate: that he has the support of the whole international community. He 
stated, 'Will President Habyarimana finally agree to swear in a transitional government in 
which he has no blocking minority, or will renewed violence, orchestrated by the political 
militia, once again break out during the next few days? Rwanda has genuinely reached a 
crossroads; it will either disintegrate into self-destructive violence, as has neighboring 
Burundi, or it will adhere to the Arusha Accords and commit itself to power-sharing 
between the Hutu majority and the Patriotic Front.'65  
The establishment of the transitional government remained stalled despite repeated 
efforts to push it along. On 28 March 1994, the UN Special Representative, the Apostolic 
Nuncio, a representative of the Tanzanian foreign minister, and the ambassadors of the 
Observer Countries to the Arusha Process (Belgium, France, the United States, Germany, 
Burundi, Senegal and Uganda) met in Kigali to consider why the broadly-based 
transitional government and Parliament remained blocked.66 All that happened was more 
diplomatic urging of parties to implement what was agreed at Arusha. Then on 3 April 
1994, the European Community (EC) stressed its concern over the political situation in 
Rwanda by passing a resolution condemning the recent upsurge in violence that led to 
Minister Gatabazi's assassination and the tragic death of Mr. Bucyana. The resolution hit 
two key areas: the extremist Hutu hate propaganda machine and the flood of arms 
throughout the country, and it:  
[d]emanded full investigation into the matters and that justice take its course, reiterated 
EC support for the Arusha Accords and expressed deep concern over delay in 
establishing the Broad-based transitional government. Categorized the internal situation 
as increasing insecurity throughout the country, particularly in Kigali and its environs; 
unacceptable role of some media which are blocking the indispensable climate of national 
reconciliation; proliferation of weapons.67  
EC representatives in Kigali demarched President Habyarimana on the resolution with no 
result. Finally, on 6 April, a one day mini-summit to discuss the political crises in 
Rwanda and Burundi convened in Dar Es Salaam. It consisted of the heads of state of 
Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Zambia, Uganda, the Vice President of Kenya, and 
the Secretary General of the OAU. The shooting down of President Habyarimana's jet 
following the conference pre-empted any positive result of the meeting.  
Clearly, the various international actors, except France, lacked the ability to influence and 
enforce the agreement. This was not due entirely to lack of trying by international actors, 
but in part to the government's and other Hutu extremists' complicity in seeing Arusha 
fail. However, whether intentionally or not, continued French military support influenced 
Habyarimana to derail implementation of Arusha.  
The Willingness to use Force to Uphold Arusha  
Preventive diplomacy worked in that the civil war was stopped and the Arusha Accords 
were signed. Had the government abided by the agreement then perhaps Rwanda's history 
may have been slightly different. The real failure rests with the international community's 
unwillingness to threaten the use of military force to uphold the accords.  
If political and economic influence fail to get the parties to abide by the settlement, then 
external actors must use force to uphold the agreement. The use of force by external 
actors demonstrates true commitment to the peace process. Otherwise, they should 
disengage the costs being too great for their interests and accept the consequences.  
UNAMIR's mandate fell under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, peacekeeping, rather than 
Chapter VII, peace enforcement. A Chapter VI mandate depends on all parties endorsing 
the peacekeeping force and a negotiated peace agreement, which had been attained at 
Arusha. UNAMIR's force structure was too small and ill-equipped for effective execution 
of its peacekeeping mission, let alone to conduct peace enforcement operations. Dallaire, 
UNAMIR commander, remarked in February that his force was ill-equipped and that if 
war reerupted he would face a peace enforcement situation.  
The minute there is a significant cease-fire violation by either side, then we do not have a 
peacekeeping role anymore, because the only reason we are here is that both sides wanted 
peace, both sides were prepared to implement the peace process and also to respect the 
peace, and so if there is a civil war, which has the violations of any cease-fire agreement 
that has been established, then we are no more in a peacekeeping role and my mandate 
does not exist here any more.68  
However, on 14 January 1994, Colonel Marchal under direction from Major General 
Dallaire, asked the Belgian Ambassador to Rwanda to grant political asylum to a highly 
placed informer who had provided UNAMIR with the location of arms caches and the 
existence of lists of people to be exterminated. Neither Belgium, France, nor the United 
States provided safe passage for the informer, who would have provided the full plans of 
the genocide. Dallaire confirmed this information, warned the UN, and asked for 
permission to conduct search and disarmament operations. New York denied the request 
because such an operation would be "offensive," and thus not consistent with UNAMIR's 
Chapter VI mandate.69  
Apparently mid-February was the critical point where the international community 
needed to display a willingness to threaten to use force. By March, events were spiralling 
out of control. The various actors in the international community should have listened to 
the warnings and recommendations from UN Special Envoy Booh-Booh, UNAMIR 
Force Commander Dallaire, and various Belgian diplomats. The UN Security Council 
might have reviewed UNAMIR's mandate, changed it to let Dallaire be more "offensive," 
and given him the authority to act on information such as he had in January. UNAMIR 
would have needed more troops and equipment, especially light armored vehicles and 
trucks, if a revised mandate was to be effective. However, the UN force would have had 
the means to influence the security situation and more importantly could have intervened 
to stop the genocide as it began.  
In addition to granting UNAMIR more robust powers and reinforcing it, an arms 
embargo could have been imposed on all sides as part of the UNAMIR mandate. Actual 
effectiveness of such action would in all probability have been minimal, as evidenced by 
the continued flow of arms to the FAR following the May 1994 UN arms embargo.70 
Although the FAR claimed that the lack of arms and munitions was the primary reason 
for their defeat, this is unlikely given the amount of weapons and ammunition abandoned 
and taken to Zaire. Furthermore, an arms embargo would have had little impact on the 
genocide since the militias were already well armed and most of the deaths were caused 
by edged or blunt weapons, not firearms. Nevertheless, it would have sent a stronger 
signal of the international community's commitment to implementing the Arusha Peace 
Agreement. At a minimum, a UN Security Council debate over an arms embargo, while 
probably not controlling the French, would at least have called them to task on their 
support to the Habyarimana regime as it delayed setting up the transitional government.  
By contrast, changing UNAMIR's mandate could have been done quickly and if done 
early enough would have allowed Dallaire to pre-empt Hutu extremist plans and show the 
resolve of the international community to threaten to use force and if necessary use it to 
uphold Arusha. Modifying the mandate from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII, thus 
allowing UNAMIR troops to use force to uphold their mandate, could have saved the 
lives of the ten Belgian paratroopers killed by the Presidential Guard. While no country 
contributing peacekeepers wants its soldiers hurt or killed, by accepting a Chapter VII 
mandate certain risks are accepted. The paratroopers would not have opted to radio back 
to headquarters seeking instructions as to whether or not they should lay down their arms 
and they would have been able to defend the prime minister. UNAMIR would have 
become immediately involved in reestablishing order in Kigali.  
However, finding and deploying the additional troops and equipment would have taken 
several months to accomplish. While European troops rapidly deployed to Kigali to 
evacuate expatriates in April 1994, it is highly unlikely that the West would have 
provided company and battalion sized contingents to reinforce UNAMIR. First, the RPF 
probably would not have allowed French troops. Other European countries were focused 
on Bosnia and the United States was still involved in Somalia. As early as September 
1993, President Clinton stated that  
UN Security Council deliberations lately, the United States had begun asking tougher 
questions about new peacekeeping missions, such as: 'Is there a real threat to 
international peace? Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? Can an end point 
be identified ...? How much will the mission cost?'71  
Furthermore, as Prunier has noted, "Rwanda is a small landlocked African country 
without strategic or economic interest, populated by black people."72  
Clearly, the international community lacked the will to threaten to use force and if needed 
to use it to uphold Arusha. No one challenged the Presidential Guard and the 
interahamwe and impuzamugambi as they carried out their genocide plan. During the first 
48 hours, the 600-man RPF security battalion fought for its life and did what it could to 
defend civilians targeted by the death squads. If UNAMIR had controlled events in 
Kigali, it is highly likely that the genocide would not have spread to the countryside, and 
if it did, a more robust UNAMIR probably could have contained it since the perpetrators 
seemed to be easily intimidated by a minimal show of force. In this case, some 
peacekeepers might have become casualties while saving the lives of hundreds of 
thousands of Rwandans. Furthermore, even if UNAMIR had not received additional 
contingents, Western powers demonstrating their will to use force could have rapidly 
reinforced UNAMIR. Instead of solely evacuating expatriates, the troops could have 
aided UNAMIR in reestablishing order.  
Conclusion 
In the Rwanda case, after fighting to a stalemate, the parties agreed to negotiate an end 
the civil war and to speed up the process of transition to a multi-party democracy. 
Therefore, the first internal variable, consensus to resolve their differences through 
negotiation, was present and culminated in the signing of the Arusha Accords. However, 
even before the Arusha Peace Agreement was signed, the Rwanda government and Hutu 
extremists had planned a campaign to stall the implementation of the accords and 
ultimately execute a plan to eliminate the political opposition, thus rendering the accords 
unnecessary. Thus, the second internal variable, the parties' desire to abide by and 
implement the agreement, was absent. Had these two internal variables been present, then 
preventive diplomacy could have claimed success with or without the presence of the two 
external variables.  
Because the government and Hutu extremists did not intend to live up to Arusha, 
successful preventive diplomacy required external actors to influence the concerned 
parties to uphold and implement the solution, the first external variable. Although the 
various international actors used political and economic pressure to persuade the regime 
to abide by the agreement, they failed, in part because the Hutu extremists could not be 
influenced to uphold Arusha. Furthermore, whether deliberately or not, one international 
actor, France, did influence the Habyarimana regime to derail implementation of Arusha. 
The Habyarimana government used the various conferences as a means to delay 
instituting the transitional government. However, the international community is not 
blameless either, because of its reliance on using diplomacy when it became clear that 
sterner methods were required. Diplomatic demarches fell on deaf ears, as Habyarimana 
knew that his goal was to retain power at all costs.  
In the Rwanda case the international community needed to communicate the second 
external variable: a credible threat to use force and be willing to use it, if civil war and 
genocide were to have been averted. Rwanda presents a worst case and a far too common 
scenario that preventive diplomacy faces, whereby participants to the conflict are less 
than open and honest with their objectives and about their willingness to resolve their 
conflict through negotiation.  
The international community was unable to support its diplomatic efforts with military 
force when it became clear that one party had no intention of implementing the 
agreement. The international community could have communicated its willingness by 
changing UNAMIR's mandate to peacemaking. It may not have actually had to apply 
military force directly, but at least the threat of using it quickly would have been present. 
When calls to reevaluate UNAMIR's mandate and to provide more troops and equipment 
went unheeded, Hutu extremists probably realized that the international community 
would do nothing if they executed their plan to exterminate moderate Hutus and Tutsis as 
a whole. They no longer needed Habyarimana as he became a liability and they 
assassinated him as others had been.73 The Hutu extremists recognized that when all else 
fails use force and violence to accomplish political objectives. The RPF realized that 
military force was the only way to stop the genocide and to survive.  
The international actors lacked the will to support their diplomatic efforts with military 
power when it was needed most. This impacts on the international community's 
credibility and ability to prevent conflict. A basic political science tenet is the ability to 
use power to impose one's will on another for a desired effect. Unfortunately, the 
international community did not understand that a vital component of successful 
preventive diplomacy is the willingness to threaten to use military power or its actual use 
when all else fails. In the Rwandan case that vital component was missing.  
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totally different. Furthermore, the first, second and third variables are missing, yet 
preventive diplomacy is the tool of choice and is expected to succeed. More importantly 
still, the international community has little will to use force, despite calls for it, which in 
this case would not uphold a negotiated settlement, but could plunge Burundi into the 
massive ethnic slaughter that such an intervention wants to prevent.  
73. The author agrees with journalist assessments that the shooting down of the 
president's aircraft was a calculated event used to remove Habyarimana from the scene 
and to ignite the genocide. Extremists viewed him as too soft and feared that he would 
soon implement portions of the Arusha Accords. Gaillard and Barrada, "The Story Direct 
from the Habyarimana Family," pp. 12-19.  
 
